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Abstract 
 
Countries  restrict the export  of natural resources  to lower domestic  prices, stimulate 
downstream industries, earn rents on international markets,  or on environmental grounds. 
This paper  provides empirical  evidence of evasion of such export  barriers.  Using tools 
from  the  illicit  trade   literature, I  show  that exports  of minerals,   metals,   or  wood 
products  are more likely to be missing from the exporter’s statistics if they face export 
barriers  such  as  prohibitions or  taxes.    Furthermore,  I  show  that this  relationship 
is significantly  higher  in countries  with  high  levels of corruption.  The  results  have 
implications  for the design of trade  policies and environmental protection. 
 
JEL  CODES:  F13, O17, O19 
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1    Introduction 
 
 
Trade in natural resources is highly regulated, mostly on the export side. According to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO, 2010), about one-third of all export taxes cover natural resource sectors. Countries 
restrict the export of natural resources to lower domestic prices, promote downstream industries, earn rents on 
international markets, or on environmental grounds. For example China recently restricted the export of rare 
earth metals, the US has been restricting oil and gas exports, and Nigeria bans the export of timber.1    In this 
paper I show that the illegal avoidance of such barriers  is rife and leaves traces in official statistics. To do so, I 
follow the literature on tariff evasion (e.g. Fisman and Wei (2004)) and show that the trade gap, i.e. the log 
difference between imports and mirror exports, is significantly correlated with export barriers. To put it simply, 
exports are more likely to be missing from the exporter’s official statistics when export barriers are in place, 
suggesting part of the reported imports have illegally circumvented export barriers. 
 
My results suggest that the trade gap is as much as 87% larger for products facing export taxes. In 
other words, illegal exports may amount to as much as reported exports when taxes are in place. The 
biggest effect by far is found for export prohibitions; the trade gap is around 12 times larger for prohibited 
exports than for all other  products. In the case of prohibition,  practically  all recorded imports may reflect illegal 
exports. These effects are strongest in countries facing corruption problems where bribes may hinder barrier 
enforcement. Interestingly, I do not find a significant effect for export license requirements. This may point to 
export licenses as the most adequate  tool to fight evasion on restricted exports. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature in two main ways. Firstly, while the trade and environmental 
consequences of export restrictions on natural resources have been studied for a long time (e.g. Dean and 
Gangopadhyay (1997), Fung and Korinek (2013), and Korinek and 
 
1 For a review of recent trends  in export  restrictions, see Kim (2010).
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Kim (2010)), this paper is the first to look empirically at their impact  on illegal behavior.2 
 
As the WTO (2010) puts it, natural resources present particular challenges for policymakers, in part because they 
are both essential to the production process and potentially exhaustible. Designing efficient trade polices is thus of 
upmost importance. This paper highlights that attention also needs to be given to the unintended 
consequences of such polices. Second, I add to the previous  illicit-trade studies  by Berger and Nitsch (2012), 
Fisman and Wei (2004), Javorcik and Narciso (2008), and Mishra et al. (2008), by bringing attention to 
export barriers rather than import tariffs.3 
 
The next section (2) describes the data and my empirical strategy. Section (3) discusses the results. A last 
section (4) concludes. 
 
 
 
 
2    Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
 
I use data on export restrictions collected by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
 
Development (OECD) and covering 51 countries in the years 2009-2010 (Fliess and Mard, 
 
2012) (my matching with trade data allows me to run regressions using information on 43 countries. These 
are listed in Figure 3). It covers most minerals and metals, as well as wood products, in their unprocessed as well 
as in their semi-processed form. Waste and scrap metal is also included. Commodities covered belong 
mainly to Chapters 25-28, 44-46, 71-72, and 74-81 of the HS 2007 classification.4    Among the 780 products 
within the HS chapters covered, 390 face an export barrier. On average a product faces barriers in 1 country, 
and 
2 This  adds  to  a wide array  of case studies  though.   For  example,  Aning  (2003) examines  the  behavior 
of ’spoilers’ who circumvent governments’  domestic  regulation  of trade  in natural resources  in West  Africa. 
Bleischwitz et al. (2012) examines illicit exports  of coltan in the Democratic  Republic of Congo in an attempt 
to draw lessons for certification. In related  work Morcom and Kremer  (2000) have looked at policies aimed 
at deterring  ivory trade. 
3 A previous  study  by  Fisman  and  Wei  (2009)  did  look at  the  illegal evasion  of export  barriers  yet  it 
focused specifically on an  export  ban  on antiques.  It  found  that more  antiques  exports  were likely to  be 
missing in corrupt countries. 
4 The  database does not  cover all 5,000+  products in the  HS classification.   This  is one more reason  for 
this paper’s focus.
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at most in 20 countries. A large share of the recorded export measures (42% of measures in 
 
2009 and 46% in 2010) concern waste and scrap of metal. This is followed by metal ores and minerals, precious 
metals and stones, and ferrous metals. The intensity of export barriers by country is displayed in Figure 1. 
China, India, South Africa, and Argentina appear as the biggest users of such barriers. 
 
The export barriers may be export taxes, VAT tax reductions, export quotas, export licences, 
prohibitions, domestic market obligations, captive mining, minimum export prices, and other measures. In 
my empirical analysis I use 4 dummy indicators. One for any type of export barrier, one for export taxes, one 
for export licenses, and one for prohibitions.  I choose these 3 measures as they are the most widespread. 
 
To uncover illegal exports empirically, I first compute ‘missing exports’, i.e.  exports missing from the 
exporter’s official statistics, as these  are likely to include  illegal exports that have circumvented export barriers at 
customs.  To do so I use data on trade flows from UN Comtrade at the HS 6-digit level. More precisely, this 
measure is computed for both trade values and quantities (kilograms) as follows: 
 
 
 
 
(1)  Missing exportsijt  = ln(World Importsijt )  ln(Exportsijt ) 
 
 
where Exportsijt  indicate total exports of product  i, measured at the HS 6-digit level, from country j in year t. 
World Importsijt   is the mirror  image of Exportsijt  as reported by all importing countries. 
 
Yet ‘missing exports’ are not by themselves a good proxy for illegal exports. Indeed, import values include 
cost-insurance and freight (cif) costs whereas export values are free on board (fob), so the difference in reports also 
reflects transport  costs. Trade may also be missing due to exchange-rate miscalculations, different accounting 
procedures, or statistical errors. For this reason, ‘missing exports’ may not be used to quantify illegal exports precisely.
5 
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Nevertheless, as Fisman and Wei (2004) argue, ‘missing  trade’ still allows us to identify 
 
correlation patterns and uncover the causes of illicit flows. In the absence of illegal behavior, there should be no 
correlation between export barriers and the trade gap. Yet if the trade gaps is significantly higher for exports 
facing trade barriers, it is highly likely that missing exports include illegal exports that have circumvented customs. 
In other words, the difference in trade gaps between exports facing barriers and other exports most likely captures  
illegal exports. 
To test for illegal evasion of export barriers hypothesis statistically, I thus estimate  the following regression 
model: 
 
(2)  Missing exportsijt  = njt +  
 
Barrierk 
  
+  ijt
 
 
where ‘Barrier’ is a dummy indicating an export barrier, k stands for the type of export 
 
barrier, i stands for product defined at the HS 6-digit level, j for exporting country, t for year, and n for industry, defined 
at the HS 2-digit level. I choose to include industry-country-year fixed effects, i.e. njt , to account for country-, 
year-, or industry-specific attributes that could be driving the relationship between barriers and trade gaps. The 
identifying variation is thus the most precise across-products as possible, i.e. within country-industry-year.5 
 
 
 
3    Results 
 
 
The benchmark results are in Table 2. Whether I take missing exports in dollars or kilograms, I find a positive and 
significant coefficient on the export-barrier dummy, the prohibition dummy, and the export tax dummy.  
These suggest that the trade gap is between 36% and 50% larger for products facing any type of export 
barrier (exp()-1). In other words, 
5 I do not  include  country-product fixed effects as Javorcik  and  Narciso (2008) and  Mishra  et al. (2008) 
as there  is too little  variation across the  two years covered.  I thus  opt  for an identification across products 
as in Fisman  and Wei (2004).
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illegal exports may amount to as much as a third of legal exports.  For export taxes the 
 
trade gap may be as much as 87% larger. Yet the biggest effect by far is found for export prohibitions; the 
trade gap is around 12 times larger for prohibited exports than for all other products. Interestingly, I do not find a 
significant effect for export license requirements. This may suggest that this type of export barrier is most adequate 
in avoiding illegal exports. Another explanation is that the illegal activity is displaced  from border circumvention 
to license acquisition. In this case illegal exports would not appear in the trade gap but rather in a illegal licenses. 
 
In robustness checks I take into account zero trade flows by taking inverse hyperbolic sine rather than logs as the 
former are defined at zero (see Rotunno et al. (2013) for more on this method). The results in Table 3 confirm the 
benchmark results. Finally, as the trade gap and export barriers may also be correlated with import tariffs I also 
run regressions controlling for the simple average of tariffs on the product across all importing countries, using 
tariff data from TRAINS. The export-barrier evasion results are robust to this additional control variable (Table 
4). Furthermore, I find the usual tariff-evasion results where more imports are missing when tariffs are high, 
when measuring  trade in dollars. 
 
I also examine the role of corruption in illegal export. The idea here is that in the presence of corruption it should be 
even more likely for exporters to evade barriers, for example by paying bribes. Dutt and Traca (2010) showed 
that when tariffs are high, corruption greases the wheels of commerce, i.e. make it more likely for tariffs to be 
avoided. Similarly, Fisman and Wei (2009) showed that banned antique exports were more likely to be 
missing from corrupt countries. More generally, Berger and Nitsch (2012) showed that missing imports 
were correlated with measures of corruption around the world.  An example comes from The 
Economist (2014) which describes a massive scam in India where a mafia made profits of about $2 billion shipping 
illegal iron ore to China. The bank details found on computers taken into custody created a trail of 70 families who 
had bribed officials and politicians to make the exports possible. Hence, if the correlation between missing 
exports and export barriers
7 
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indeed captures illegal exports, it should be even higher in countries where circumvention 
 
of barriers  via bribes  is widespread. One way to test for this is to look at how the missing exports-export barrier 
relationship varies across countries with different levels of corruption. 
 
In Table 5 I show results of regressions where the export-barrier dummy is interacted with corruption in 
the exporting country (using the 2-year average negative of the World Governance Indicator for control-of-
corruption).  I find a positive and significant interaction of corruption with export barriers and prohibitions. These 
suggest that missing exports are higher for product facing such barriers and even more so in corrupt countries. 
I still find no effect of export  licenses on missing exports, no matter the level of corruption. And while the 
interaction of corruption and export taxes is insignificant, the relationship between corruption and the effect of 
export taxes is similar to that of the other barriers. This is illustrated in Figure 2 which shows that missing exports 
of taxed products are only significantly higher than those of non-barrier-facing  products  when corruption is 
above the world average. This thus provides further evidence that the relationship between export barriers 
and missing exports captures illegal behavior. 
 
To investigate further how the missing export-export barrier relationship varies across countries, I also 
estimate the barrier semi-elasticity of missing export values by country by estimating the following model: 
 
 
(3)  Missing exportsit  = nt +  
 
Barrierk 
 
+  it 
 
 
which is the equivalent of model 2 yet without the   subscript. Results in Figure 3 indicate that Nigeria, Kenya, 
Bolivia, Kazakhstan, and Jamaica may have the highest level of illegal behavior.  The ranking of countries 
confirms that corruption  is linked to illegal exports. Nigeria in particular appears as an outlier with a semi-elasticity 
of missing exports as high as 8.5.
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4    Conclusion 
 
 
This paper has shown that the illegal avoidance of export barriers on natural resources is alive and well and that 
corruption  plays a role. This suggests that if the trade is to be controlled for environmental reasons, more effort needs 
to be put in tackling corruption, which allow for barrier circumvention. More research is also needed to understand 
how trade policies can be better designed to minimize illegal avoidance in the presence of corruption in the 
exporting country.  One possibility is for the importing country to ban imports of illegal exports. One such 
example is the US Lacey Act of 1900, amended in 2008 to make it unlawful to import, export, transport, 
sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign commerce any plant in violation of any foreign law that 
protects plants.6   Similar initiatives could be extended to all natural resources for which trade is restricted for 
environmental reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 The Lacey Act was invoked in a 2009 raid on Gibson which was using hardwoods  that had been illegally 
exported  from Madagascar for its guitar  manufacturing.
9 
 
 
References 
 
 
Aning, E.K., 2003. Regulating illicit trade in natural resources: The role of regional actors in west africa. Review of 
African Political Economy 30(95), 99–107. 
 
Berger, H., Nitsch, V., 2012. Gotcha!: a profile of smuggling in international trade, in: Storti, C.C., de 
Grauwe, P. (Eds.), Illicit Trade and the Global Economy. MIT Press. 
 
Bleischwitz, R., Dittrich, M., Pierdicca, C., 2012. Coltan from central africa, international trade and implications 
for any certification. Resources Policy 37(1), 19–29. 
 
Dean, J.M., Gangopadhyay, S.,  1997.  Export bans, environmental protection, and 
unemployment. Review of Development Economics 1(3), 324–36. 
 
Dutt, P., Traca, D., 2010. Corruption and bilateral trade flows: Extortion  or evasion?  The 
 
Review of Economics and Statistics 92(4), 843–860. 
 
 
Fisman, R., Wei, S.J., 2004.  Tax rates and rax evasion: evidence from missing imports in 
 
China.  Journal of Political Economy 112(2), 471–500. 
 
 
Fisman, R., Wei, S.J., 2009. The smuggling of art, and the art of smuggling: Uncovering the illicit trade in 
cultural property and antiques. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1(3), 82–96. 
 
Fliess, B., Mard, T., 2012. Taking Stock of Measures Restricting the Export of Raw Materials:
 Analysis of OECD Inventory Data.  OECD Trade Policy Paper 140. 
Organization for Economic Coopeartion and Development. 
 
Fung, K., Korinek, J., 2013. Economics of Export Restrictions as Applied to Industrial Raw 
 
Materials. OECD Trade Policy Papers 155. OECD Publishing. 
 
 
Javorcik, B.S., Narciso, G., 2008. Differentiated products and evasion of import tariffs. 
 
Journal of International Economics 76(2), 208–222.
10 
 
 
Kim, J., 2010. Recent Trends in Export Restrictions. OECD Trade Policy Papers 101. 
 
OECD Publishing. 
 
 
Korinek, J., Kim, J., 2010. Export Restrictions on Strategic Raw Materials and Their Impact on Trade. 
OECD Trade Policy Papers 95. OECD Publishing. 
 
Mishra, P., Subramanian, A., Topalova, P., 2008. Tariffs, enforcement, and customs evasion: Evidence  from 
India. Journal of Public Economics 92(10-11), 1907–1925. 
 
Morcom, C., Kremer, M., 2000. Elephants. American Economic Review 90(1), 212–234. 
 
 
Rotunno, L., Vezina, P.L., Wang, Z., 2013. The rise and fall of (chinese)  african  apparel exports. Journal of 
Development Economics 105(0), 152 – 163. 
 
The Economist, ., 2014. Fighting corruption in India. Print Edition, 15 March. 
 
 
WTO, 2010.   Trade in natural resources.   World Trade Report 2010. World Trade 
 
Organization.
11 
 
 
 
 
 
              Table 1:  Summary statistics   
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Missing dollars 22452 0.035 2.407 -15.6 16.2 
Missing KG 21773 -0.114 2.751 -18.0 19.0 
Export barrier 22452 0.065 0.246 0 1 
Prohibition 22452 0.002 0.041 0 1 
Export tax 22452 0.046 0.209 0 1 
License 22452 0.016 0.127 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Export-barrier evasion: Evidence from missing exports 
(1) (2)      (3)     (4)     (5) Missing 
dollars 
 
Export barrier 0.413***    0.182 
 
Prohibition 
(0.125)
2.533*** 
  (0.154) 
2.328*** 
 
Export tax 
 (0.724)
0.628*** 
 (0.715) 
0.503*** 
 
License 
  (0.127)
-0.221 
(0.169) 
-0.484** 
    (0.188) (0.193) 
Observations 22,452 22,452 22,452 22,452 22,452 
R-squared 0.130 0.131 0.131 0.129 0.132 
Missing kilograms 
Export barrier 0.307**                              0.0684 (0.126) (0.174) 
Prohibition 2.200***                   2.111*** (0.606)
 (0.607) 
Export tax                        0.464***          0.425** (0.123) (0.179) 
License  -0.151    -0.300 
(0.223) (0.233) 
 
Observations   22,077   22,077   22,077  22,077  22,077 
R-squared       0.130    0.130    0.130   0.130   0.131 
Note:     All  regression   include   country-industry-year  fixed  effects. 
Product-clustered s.e. in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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    Table 3:  Export-barrier evasion:  Robustness to zeros   
(1) (2)      (3)     (4)     (5) Missing 
dollars 
 
Export barrier 0.622***    -0.212 
 
Prohibition 
(0.172)
2.064*** 
  (0.241) 
2.228*** 
 
Export tax 
 (0.454)
0.902*** 
 (0.441) 
1.079*** 
   (0.151)  (0.219) 
License    0.118 0.0738 
    (0.228) (0.253) 
Observations 42,742 42,742 42,742 42,742 42,742 
R-squared 0.433 0.433 0.433 0.432 0.434 
Missingkilograms
Export barrier 0.769***    -0.362 
 
Prohibition 
(0.258)
3.628*** 
  (0.399) 
3.919*** 
 
Export tax 
 (0.796)
0.916*** 
 (0.793) 
1.205*** 
   (0.222)  (0.358) 
License    0.155 0.202 
    (0.334) (0.393) 
Observations 42,742 42,742 42,742 42,742 42,742 
R-squared 0.474 0.475 0.474 0.474 0.475 
Note:     All  regression   include   country-industry-year  fixed  effects. 
Product-clustered s.e. in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Export-barrier evasion: Robustness to controlling for tariffs 
(1) (2)       (3)       (4)       (5) Missing dollars 
 
Export barrier 0.378***    0.178 
 
Prohibition 
(0.112)
3.054*** 
  (0.146) 
2.851*** 
 
Export tax 
 (0.666)
0.580*** 
 (0.674) 
0.459*** 
 
License 
  (0.121)
-0.273 
(0.162) 
-0.518*** 
 
Import tariff 
 
-0.107*** -0.112*** -0.109*** 
(0.171)
-0.119*** 
(0.183) 
-0.110*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0257) (0.0249) 
Observations 20,748 20,748 20,748 20,748 20,748 
R-squared 0.139 0.140 0.140 0.138 0.142 
Missingkilograms
Export barrier 0.300**    0.0340 
 
Prohibition 
(0.119)
2.910*** 
  (0.165) 
2.845*** 
 
Export tax 
 (0.592)
0.449*** 
 (0.607) 
0.436** 
   (0.120)  (0.172) 
License    -0.164 -0.281 
    (0.210) (0.217) 
Import tariff -0.0401 -0.0428 -0.0417 -0.0488 -0.0410 
 (0.0293) (0.0296) (0.0295) (0.0296) (0.0291) 
Observations 20,325 20,325 20,325 20,325 20,325 
R-squared 0.136 0.137 0.137 0.136 0.138 
Note:     All  regression   include   country-industry-year  fixed  effects. 
Product-clustered s.e. in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5:  Export-barrier evasion:  The role of corruption  
 
 (1)      (2) (3)        (4)
Without zeros With zeros
Dollars Kilograms Dollars Kilograms 
Export barrier 0.106 0.0303 0.326* 0.460 
 (0.133) (0.162) (0.177) (0.305) 
× Corruption 0.725***
(0.186) 
0.642***
(0.225) 
0.654***
(0.169) 
0.679* 
(0.379) 
Prohibition 1.432* 1.092 1.612*** 3.103*** 
 (0.809) (0.670) (0.475) (0.914) 
× Corruption 1.917** 1.930** 0.898*** 1.042 
 (0.852) (0.816) (0.341) (0.740) 
Export tax 0.560*** 0.635*** 0.568** 0.492 
 (0.191) (0.216) (0.264) (0.393) 
× Corruption 0.121 -0.303 0.561 0.712 
 (0.304) (0.347) (0.440) (0.655) 
License -0.259 -0.219 0.0444 0.101 
 (0.186) (0.227) (0.220) (0.359) 
× Corruption 0.309 0.490* 0.347 0.259 
 (0.193) (0.272) (0.219) (0.565) 
Note:     All  regression   include   country-industry-year  fixed  effects. 
Product-clustered s.e. in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 2: The role of corruption
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Note:  Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.  Thin dashed line is a kernel 
density  estimate of corruption. These figures are based on regressions in Table  5.
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Figure 3: Semi-elasticity of missing export values 
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Note:   The  semi-elasticities  are  obtained by  estimating model  3 by  country.   A 
higher semi-elasticity suggests a higher illegal response to trade  barriers. 
